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example includes a grassroots logistics 
effort that supported a national army 
by coordinating donations of money 
and supplies from across the globe� 
It proved so effective that Ukrainian 
military commanders sent in supply 
orders; in true e-commerce fashion, 
civilians fulfilled the requests and even 
delivered items—including uniforms 
and flak jackets—to units in the field� 
Contrast this effort to the U�S� Liberty 
Bond and war bond drives of the two 
world wars as an indirect mechanism for 
noncombatant support� The Ukrainian 
Facebook-driven campaign, although 
conducted outside sanctioned govern-
ment control, had more impact on the 
individual donor, because the donors 
could see the direct effects of their 
efforts� The nature of much civilian 
support for a belligerent on one side of 
a conflict has not changed—consider 
care packages and letters in the mail 
in wars past� Yet the characteristics 
have transformed through individual 
empowerment, displaying a magnitude 
and immediacy unseen in military 
history� It exemplifies a transfer of 
real impact on combat effectiveness 
from traditional institutions and 
hierarchies to networks of individuals�
For centuries the United States enjoyed 
a geopolitical position that protected 
our shores from direct interventions� 
Arguably, cyberspace, with its instant 
accessibility from afar, could counterbal-
ance that advantage� As we begin to 
understand cyberborne capabilities 
enabling conflicts, works such as War 
in 140 Characters should shape the way 
we think about our vulnerabilities� The 
book constitutes an author’s plea to un-
derstand better twenty-first-century war, 
and it leaves the reader compelled to 
ponder the strategic implications of the 
way ahead� Do information revolutions 
of the past, such as the advents of the 
printing press, radio, and television, 
illuminate a path forward for society to 
follow? It is clear from Patrikarakos’s 
work that increasingly effective individ-
uals promulgating disparate realities on 
social media will mandate entirely new 
approaches from traditional Western 
institutions if they are going to survive�
MARC D� BEAUDREAU
Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Poli-
tics, by Austin Carson� Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Univ� Press, 2018� 344 pages� $35�
Professor Carson takes up two intriguing 
and related questions: Why do nations 
often choose to intervene covertly 
rather than overtly in military conflicts, 
and why do their adversaries, after 
detecting the intervention, often choose 
to stay silent about it (or, as he calls it, 
“collude”)? Using four case studies (the 
Spanish Civil War, the Korean War, 
the Vietnam War, and the Soviet war 
in Afghanistan), he develops his own 
theory of why nations act these ways�
His theory applies to “limited wars”—
conflicts in which some of the adversar-
ies (the outside great-power intervenors) 
are not employing the full range of their 
capabilities� Carson argues that main-
taining a war’s limited character provides 
the motivation for this collusion of co-
vertness� Demonstrating how this works 
is the core of his argument, and the case 
studies provide persuasive examples�
First, by intervening covertly—or by 
not publicizing an adversary’s covert 
intervention—a party avoids stirring 
up hawkish public opinion, both 
domestically and on the part of the 
adversary� By avoiding public demands 
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to “win the war” by whatever means 
necessary and risk a face-losing, 
disadvantageous settlement, both 
leaderships preserve maneuver room�
Second, by thus reducing the political 
consequences, both parties can signal 
their desire to keep the conflict limited� 
In essence, both sides bargain—while 
pursuing their respective interests—and 
cooperate in escalation avoidance� 
Since this point is the book’s key 
contribution to the literature on this 
subject, let us see how it works�
An intervenor proceeding covertly 
instead of overtly pays a price: he may 
be constrained in the size of the force he 
sends and the weaponry employed, his 
logistics may be more complicated and 
less efficient, and he forgoes whatever 
reputational advantage he might gain 
by being seen as having supported his 
allies and stood up for his principles� 
By paying this price, the intervenor 
signals to his adversary that his desire 
to win is constrained by his interest in 
keeping the conflict limited; he shows 
respect for the adversary’s reputation 
by not confronting him openly�
When the adversary detects the 
intervention yet does not use his 
knowledge to diplomatic or propa-
ganda advantage, he likewise signals 
his interest in avoiding escalation� He 
shows that he is avoiding a self-imposed 
requirement to confront the intervenor 
openly and defeat his intervention�
While Carson argues for the importance 
of this dynamic, he fully recognizes 
that many other reasons for covertness 
and collusion exist beyond the two he 
discusses: “[I]t bears repeating that my 
limited-war theory does not claim to 
be a ‘master cause’ of all secrecy in war� 
Alternative logics are compatible with 
my own logic even within the same 
conflict” (p� 63)� Thus, a government 
may intervene covertly if it hopes 
to hide its involvement from dovish 
domestic opinion, or if it seeks to 
gain an operational advantage from 
secrecy� Indeed, it is possible that 
keeping an (initial) intervention covert 
is a means of putting one’s adversary 
off his guard and thus achieving 
surprise when one subsequently 
intervenes in a more substantial way�
However, there are additional reasons 
for covertness/collusion that the 
book ignores or underemphasizes� 
If a government wants, for whatever 
reason, to follow a moderate course in 
a conflict, it has more than hawkish 
domestic opinion to worry about; it 
also must make sure that its adversaries 
or third parties do not interpret its 
moderation as weakness� Hence, it may 
employ covertness as a way of reducing 
the reputational stakes involved�
The same logic operates for the detector� 
While Carson notes that the detector 
might gain diplomatic advantages from 
going public, he underemphasizes the 
other side of the coin: complaining about 
an adversary’s intervention in a conflict 
and underreacting merely may advertise 
one’s weakness� A government also may 
collude if it fears that public knowledge 
of the adversary’s military action will 
fan fears of a wider conflict, scaring its 
own (dovish) public or third parties, 
and thereby increasing opposition to 
its own involvement in the conflict�
Additionally, a government may keep its 
intervention covert—or at least unac-
knowledged—for propaganda reasons; 
open intervention might contradict its 
own self-portrayal in its propaganda 
as pacific and anti-interventionist�
The book is at its strongest in showing 
how covertness and collusion can serve 
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the purpose of avoiding escalation� But 
ultimately, no government intervenes 
for the sake of keeping a conflict limited; 
regardless of that goal, its actions will 
be determined most by the political 
objective it seeks to achieve� The author’s 
theory sheds light on one aspect of the 
actors’ motives in cases in which the 
desire to avoid escalation is relatively 
strong� But, as in the case of any such 
theory, understanding such situations 
requires a full assessment of the goals 
and circumstances of each of the actors�
ABRAM N� SHULSKY
China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, ed� An-
drew S� Erickson and Ryan D� Martinson� An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019� 352 
pages� $50�
In its long history, China has deployed 
substantial naval power, but only 
episodically� It never faced sustained 
naval threats, so the country’s maritime 
frontier was not a perennial strategic 
concern� But in more modern times, 
seaborne pressures from the Western 
powers and Japan became unremitting� 
Foreign navies even sailed deep into the 
country’s interior, establishing “treaty 
ports” hundreds of miles from the coast� 
This ended with the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949� Still, 
even though Western naval power was 
pushed offshore, seaborne forces nearby 
could attack China with impunity�
This rankled, but what to do? In 1965, 
Marshal Lin Biao (perhaps Chairman 
Mao’s closest comrade in arms) looked 
to the earlier defeat of Japan by the 
once-tiny People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) to ask, “How was it possible for a 
weak country finally to defeat a strong 
country?” His answer was found in 
Mao Zedong’s idea of “People’s War�” 
Although land based, the concept held 
promise for menacing forward naval 
positions of the United States, perceived 
as the foremost opponent� Having 
backed an insurgency in the Philippines, 
a coup attempt in Indonesia, and guerilla 
wars in Malaya and Vietnam, Beijing 
could imagine pushing the United 
States out of great anchorages such as 
Subic, Cam Rahn, and Singapore� As 
for Yokosuka, Japan—the U�S� Navy’s 
most important base in the western 
Pacific—a successful political campaign 
might chase the United States four 
thousand miles east, back to Honolulu�
This was naval warfare de facto, but 
it did not succeed� In the end, China 
learned that American sea power 
could not be neutralized on the cheap� 
However, China began to rise 
economically through its seaborne 
connections, and in the 1980s Admiral 
Liu Huaqing—sometimes called “China’s 
Mahan”—made a case for a strong navy� 
This vision was realized more fully in 
2012 when Communist Party leader Hu 
Jintao announced a new national goal: 
“to enhance our capacity for exploiting 
marine resources, develop the marine 
economy, protect the marine maritime 
rights and interests, and build China 
into a strong maritime power�”
During this same period of an economi-
cally rising China, the Naval War Col-
lege’s China Maritime Studies Institute 
became a leading center for analyzing 
China’s naval power� Two of the Insti-
tute’s mainstays, Andrew Erickson and 
Ryan Martinson, again have contributed 
to our understanding by assembling and 
editing twenty papers prepared for a 
2017 conference on what could turn out 
to be the most significant component 
of China’s modus operandi at sea: 
exploitation of the so-called gray zone�
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